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Abstract: City councils are significant, though seldom central, actors in local policy networks 
providing public assistance to disadvantaged residents. Mayors and council members in 12 
American cities more often support than oppose public assistance initiatives. They claim that 
their own normative judgments are more important to their preferences and voting behavior on 
such matters than are public opinion, group demands, or economic considerations. While such 
elected officials hold a variety of justice principles, the most important of these affecting their 
positions on public assistance issues is the "floors" principle. A broad ethical commitment to 
providing social minimums enhances support for living-wage ordinances, for linking subsidies 
for economic development to assistance to less advantaged citizens, and for exempting spending 
on social services from budget cuts. We discuss the implications of these findings for major 
theories of urban politics and policies - collective-action theory, regime theory, and pluralism -
and for advocates on behalf of the urban poor. 
Key words: local public assistance policy networks; policies toward the homeless; living wage 
ordinances; linkage policies; social service funding; the floors principle; reconstructed pluralism 
The conventional wisdom asserts that the capacity of local governments to assist their 
most needy residents, never very great, has declined in an era of rising conservative attitudes 
and fiscal stress. 1 Hacker and Pierson (2010, 2) provide a typical assessment when they claim 
that recently "state and local governments, faced with unprecedented budget deficits, were 
slashing gaping holes in the safety net" (see also Gais, 2009). While some state and local 
governments in the U.S. have indeed reduced social welfare programs during the current 
recession, it is not yet clear how deep and widespread these cuts are. Comprehensive data, such 
as the reports on State and Local Government Finance, by the U.S. Census Bureau, are only 
available up to 2009, and these data are far from ideal. Still, they suggest that welfare spending 
at the local level (by counties and municipalities) increased by 9.2 percent between 2006-7 and 
2008-9, and public welfare constituted a slightly higher share of municipal budgets (3.16 
percent) after the recession had begun than before (when it comprised 3.13 percent of municipal 
expenditures).2 
Examples of municipalities demonstrating their continued commitments to needy 
citizens during the current recession and budgetary crises can be seen in some of the cities that 
we examine in more detail in this paper. When the State of Kansas announced during the 
summer of 2011 that it was closing the Lawrence local office for Social and Rehabilitation 
Services (as well as such offices in a half dozen smaller communities), the Lawrence City and 
Douglas County Commissions agreed to temporarily co-fund the local office, in order to 
continue to provide its nearly 20 thousand persons living below the poverty level convenient 
access to public assistance opportunities. In Kansas City, Missouri, the City Council approved 
more than a 30% increase in its allocations to agencies providing shelter and services for the 
homeless. And the City Council of Berkeley, California, made a Homeless Prevention and 
Rapid Rehousing Program one of its priorities. Although these initiatives involved relatively 
minor increases in welfare spending and were inadequate to the growing needs of the poor, they 
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do illustrate that city councils often regard municipal governments as having enduring public 
welfare responsibilities. 
Most theories of urban politics stress that municipal governments are unlikely to pursue 
welfare policies. Federal, state, and county governments have far greater jurisdiction for 
assisting the poor (Kantor 1995). Cities have economic disincentives for helping the needy, 
because generous local welfare programs can prompt capital flight, encourage in-migration of 
those who consume city services but pay little in city taxes, and lower municipal bond ratings 
(Peterson 1981; Hackworth 2007). And there are systematic biases in local power structures 
that make city officials more responsive to business interests than to the poor (Stone 1980; 
Logan and Molotch 1987). 
This paper reassesses the role of city governments in this area. We first provide the 
theoretical bases for such a reassessment. After describing our study, which draws on interviews 
with 95 elected officials in 12 cities, we then describe their support for various public assistance 
issues that arose in these cities and their support for hypothetical issues that have arisen 
elsewhere. Our reassessment does not claim that mayors and city council members are likely to 
be at the forefront of providing social justice to the urban poor, but it does enable us to see such 
officials as occasionally acting as moral agents prompted by justice principles to pursue public 
assistance policies, even in the face of jurisdictional, economic, and political constraints. 
Reassessing the Role of City Governments in Assisting the Poor 
The urban literature tends to use terms like public welfare policies, redistributive 
policies, and antipoverty policies interchangeably and loosely. We believe that an old-fashioned 
term - public assistance - is a more appropriate concept for analyzing municipal provisions to 
improve the conditions of needy citizens. Municipal governments do not provide much welfare 
as that term is commonly understood, as delivering goods and services directly to people who 
qualify for needs-based assistance; they do not establish welfare rights for the poor beyond 
3 
those provided by federal and state governments. They do not directly redistribute money, 
imposing progressive taxes on the rich to provide transfer payments to the poor. And they 
certainly do not try to eliminate poverty. What city governments can do is provide some 
programs to assist lower-income residents with basic housing, health, and other needs, offer 
some financial assistance for social service agencies that serve the poor, coordinate social 
service programs within the community, and adopt regulatory policies intended to improve the 
conditions of their most needy citizens. Today, some municipalities do nothing more in terms of 
providing public assistance than allocate funds from Community Development Bloc Grants 
(CDBGs) in ways that benefit lower-income residents, as required by federal law.3 But others 
do more (Craw 2006). Some urban scholars argue that officials in central cities have supported 
"social-centered policies" (Savitch and Kanter 2002,102-111) including "the expansion of 
social services for needy constituents" (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2004,219). Other 
urban scholars argue that city officials can do much more to improve the lives of their least 
advantaged citizens (Harvey 2009; Fainstein 2010). 
The understanding that municipalities have little or no jurisdiction for pursuing public 
assistance policies is based on readily available measures indicating that city governments are 
seldom involved in the administration of federally assisted welfare programs and rarely provide 
much welfare funding from local sources (Sharp and Maynard-Moody 1991, 942). However, 
some more recent studies suggest a larger local welfare role than indicated by such measures. 
First, Janet Pack (1998,1995) has argued that "a substantial part of public expenditures 
associated with poverty are financed from local resources," and has shown that "indirect 
poverty expenditures" - such as those on public safety and recreational facilities - are 
disproportionately targeted at the poor. Second, cities can adopt regulations - such as lifeline 
utility rates and rent controls - having redistributive impacts. The living-wage ordinance 
movement suggests that many cities have been willing and even eager to pursue such measures 
4 
(Swartz and Vasi 2011). Third, city governments may collaborate with community-based 
organizations and other entities to provide financial and organizational support for needy 
citizens (Lipsky and Smith 1990; Rich, Giles, and Stern 2001). Because this third challenge to 
the conventional wisdom involves the greatest theoretical revision to our understanding of urban 
policy, it merits a more extended discussion. 
Robert Stein (1990) has provided the most comprehensive and important analysis in this 
regard. He stresses that analysts must distinguish between the provision and the production of 
public welfare (and other local services) and recognize that alternative institutional 
arrangements can be employed to produce services - such as child care for low-income families 
- that are publically provided. Beyond the direct municipal production of a welfare service, 
municipalities increasingly employ such alternative arrangements as contracting with nonprofit 
organizations and for-profit businesses to provide the service, subsiding such entities to enable 
them to provide the service to the poor at reduced cost, or providing vouchers to the poor which 
they can redeem for services by such entities. Stein finds that these alternative arrangements 
can avoid some of the economic and political costs of public production of public assistance and 
can be more efficient than public production, although the overall effectiveness of the 
alternative arrangements is affected by many factors including the nature of the service being 
provided. According to Stein (1990, 59-61), "municipal governments with functional 
responsibilities for social services overwhelmingly employ nondirect methods for the provision 
and production of these services." 
Stein's work is informed by Elinor Ostrom's larger "collective-action" theoretical 
perspective. Ostrom (1990) is concerned that public goods can be under-produced (when 
citizens and beneficiaries hope to escape the costs of their provision) and that common-pool 
resources can be over-used (when self-interested people seek to maximize personal gains in 
ways that deplete them). Ostrom argues that the traditional solution to these collective-action 
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problems - relying on governmental coercion to require free-riders to pay their fair share and to 
regulate overconsumption - is often less effective than various self-governance arrangements. 
Affected stake-holders at the local level can work out their own solutions to collective-action 
problems, though these solutions are most effective when they take place within nested 
governmental institutions that encourage self-governance to occur and that threaten to impose 
governmental coercion if there is inadequate compliance with more decentralized solutions. 
Thus, her work has encouraged analysts to search for alternative arrangements beyond relying 
solely on coercive governments or voluntary markets. In short, Ostrom provided a theoretical 
basis for Stein and subsequent analysts of human and social services to see governments 
generally, and municipal governments specifically, as being important but sometimes over-
stressed and sometimes under-recognized agents in providing public assistance to needy 
citizens, because they are only part of a wider network of institutional agents involved in this 
policy arena (Feiock and Schotz 2010). 
While Ostrom and Stein enable urban policy analysts to better conceptualize the role of 
municipal governments in local social service networks, work in this tradition has inadequately 
theorized and investigated the role that normative concerns play in prompting city officials to 
play stronger (or weaker) roles in the alternative arrangements that emerge in cities for dealing 
with public assistance (Mansbridge 2010, 592).4 This paper addresses this deficiency by 
drawing from newer developments in pluralist theory and regime theory, which remain even 
more prominent paradigms for urban policy analysis than Ostrom's collective-action approach 
(Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe 2007, 80-84). 
While most contemporary urban analysts continue to see pluralism as explaining urban 
outcomes by reference to the diversity of interests in cities and the distribution of resources and 
power applied on behalf of different interests, political theorists now stress that leaders and 
citizens of pluralistic political communities have diverse normative principles - or alternative 
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moral doctrines (Rawls 1993) - that are brought to bear on politics. Such a reconstructed 
pluralism seeks to describe the distribution of support and opposition to diverse ethical and 
justice principles in different communities as they apply to various policy issues, to understand 
when, where, and why various normative principles matter, and how political communities 
effectively manage ethical differences and conflict (Eisenberg 1995; Schumaker 2010). 
Reconstructed pluralism thus draws attention to the ethical concerns that are ignored in 
collective-action theory. While some studies such as that by Scott, Matland, Michelbach, and 
Bornstein (2001) and Scott and Bornstein (2009) begin to identify those ethical principles that 
are most applicable to particular policy issues, much work remains to be done here. This paper 
seeks to identify the justice principles that are most important in prompting urban officials to 
play greater or lesser roles in the provision of public assistance at the local level. 
Regime theory, as developed by Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989), initially portrayed cities 
as ordinarily governed by coalitions of public and private power-wielders oriented toward 
redevelopment and growth. However, as regime theory evolved, Stone (1993, 18-23) 
recognized that some circumstances give rise to "middle-class progressive regimes" (oriented 
toward such things as affordable housing and extracting from developers linkage funds for 
social purposes) and "lower-class opportunity expansion regimes" (oriented toward enlarging 
educational, job-training, home ownership and other opportunities for the lower class). In a 
review of case studies of urban regimes, Kilburn (2004) found that almost half of the cities 
examined though the lenses of regime theory had such regime types. According to Stone (2005, 
322), more populist and progressive regimes were possible because actors in these regimes "are 
not merely interest-driven creatures but they are also meaning seekers. As such, their identities 
can be infused with moral codes and intertwined with purposes" that can include helping the 
poor. However, regime theorists have yet to develop any systematic understandings of the 
moral and justice orientations of policymakers and how these orientations affect policy 
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decisions. Scholars working within that tradition have yet to provide "ethical maps" of 
decision-makers and relate such concerns to their policymaking behavior.5 The extent to which 
officials can bring their ethical ideals to their decisions is likely to vary across different policy 
domains, and it is unclear whether ethical concerns will be particularly significant in the public 
assistance domain. Some might suppose that officials would see public assistance issues as 
invoking their sense of social justice, but others might think that "the city limits" surrounding 
the capacity of city officials to deal with public assistance would make justice principles 
especially unimportant in this issue area. 
In summary, the substantive goal of this paper is to identify some of the ways that city 
governments assist the poor. Our theoretical goal is to show that the justice principles of urban 
officials play an important role influencing the extent of public assistance that cities offer, and 
to begin to identify the most potent of these principles. Our methodological goal is to explore 
two modes of analysis that might be more fully utilized in examining these substantive and 
theoretical concerns. 
A New Study of the Role of Elected Officials in Urban Policymaking 
For this exploratory study, we completed 95 interviews with mayors and council 
members in 12 cities. Table 1 lists these cities and shows their considerable social, economic, 
and political differences.^ Eight cities in the Kansas City metropolitan area provided convenient 
locations to begin these explorations. Kansas City, Missouri (KCMO) and Kansas City, Kansas 
(KCK) were included as central cities having extensive minority and low-income populations. 
Overland Park and Lee's Summit were selected as the area's largest and most prosperous 
suburbs. Raytown is a smaller suburb on KCMO's eastern border that thrived as a "white flight" 
community during the 1950's and 60's, but has recently seen an influx of minorities and lower-
income citizens. St. Joseph was included because it was once one of Missouri's largest cities 
and one noted for its individualist culture, but has experienced economic decline in recent 
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decades. Topeka, 50 miles to the west of Kansas City, was chosen as a government city; the 
State Capitol is now 24 percent nonwhite, and more than 22 percent of its residents live below 
the poverty level. Lawrence, located between Kansas City and Topeka, was chosen because 
over 25% of its residents - including students - live below the poverty level; it has a reputation 
as a liberal university town, and a majority of city commissioners comprised a governing 
progressive coalition when most of the data for this paper was collected. 
- Table 1 goes about here -
In order to provide a basis for considering whether the findings from the Kansas City 
area might extend beyond America's heartland, we also studied four cities in California, though 
not in the same depth as the KC metro area. Berkeley was selected because of its history of 
leftist politics and having progressive city government. Richmond, to the north of Berkeley in the 
East Bay, was selected because its extensive minority population was partially incorporated into 
a biracial governing coalition 30 years (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1983, 259-60) and is now 
well represented. Stockton was selected as the largest city in California's Central Valley; 
although racially mixed and reasonably diverse economically, it has been slow to achieve 
minority incorporation. Lodi is a smaller city in the Central Valley and its politics have generally 
been regarded as economically and socially conservative. 
Despite their diversity, we do not, of course, claim that these sites constitute a random 
sample of American cities. While we attempt to control for selection bias in the quantitative 
models presented below, the findings must be regarded as tentative. Much more extensive 
research in representative cities throughout the U.S. and elsewhere will be required to develop 
and test theories of how ethics matter in the provision of public assistance by municipalities. 
Between 2003 and 2007 we contacted incumbent mayors and council members in these 
cities, asking them to participate in extensive two-stage interviews.7 All but two mayors agreed, 
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and the participation rate of council members was also high, ranging from 62 percent in 
Berkeley to 100 percent in Lee's Summit 
The first interview focused on officials' responses to various hypothetical issues and to 
specified principles of morality and justice. Additionally, we asked each official to identify and 
provide basic information on what he or she regarded as the most controversial and/or 
significant issues that had arisen recently or were currently under consideration in various 
policy areas, including social spending, neighborhood revitalization, and low-income housing. 
After completing the first-round of interviews in a city, we determined the most frequently 
mentioned concrete issues that had been at least partially resolved (i.e., there had been at least 
some council votes on the matter). 
After examining minutes of council meetings, staff reports, and newspaper accounts, and 
conducting occasional interviews with other informants to familiarize ourselves with these 
issues, we then proceeded to the second round of interviews, which focused on officials' stances 
on each of the issues and the bases of their positions. We asked each official how they had 
voted and then asked them to explain, in their own words, the basis of their preferences and 
votes.8 Drawing on a technique pioneered by John Kingdon (1989), we followed up on their 
responses by going through a checklist of factors that might have played a role in the positions 
they took. Were their positions influenced by public opinion? group pressures? the views of 
other officials? economic considerations? legal considerations? jurisdictional considerations? 
the local political culture? their own principles of morality and justice? In addition to scoring 
the degree to which each of these factors influenced their positions, we asked follow-up 
questions concerning such things as the content of the moral and justice concerns that 
influenced their positions. 
At various stages of these interviews, we also attained information on a variety of other 
matters regarding the backgrounds and characteristics of the officials and their perceptions of 
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the cities and districts from which they had been elected. In short, we also measured their 
perceptions of the sort of factors that social scientists usually examine to explain the 
policymaking behavior of urban officials. 
From these data we report here four sets of findings. First, we describe the public assistance 
issues that emerged in these cities and how they were resolved. Second, we show that elected 
municipal officials generally held and applied justice principles that led them to vote to enhance 
public assistance. Third, we show that these officials are generally a bit more supportive than 
opposed to four hypothetical public assistance issues - to issues that have come up in many 
American cities even if they had not arise in their particular community. Fourth we show that 
commitment to the floors principle increases support for hypothetical issues, even when 
controls are applied for such factors as the officials' ideological orientations and various 
personal and community characters. 
Recent Public Assistance Issues in 12 Cities 
Table 2 lists 22 public assistance issues that arose in our cities, the percentage of 
officials who voted to enhance public assistance when these issues were settled, and the extent 
to which they genuinely supported these enhancements. For example, it shows that the Raytown 
Council voted (6 to 4) to cut its locally funded emergency assistance program (REAP) due to 
budget shortfalls, despite general support for the program. However, as shown (in the first 
column), the vast majority of officials voted in favor of what they regarded as improvements or 
enhancements to public assistance on the other 21 issues. As shown in the second column, city 
officials expressed more support than opposition on most issues, but the reservations and 
opposition indicated by support scores of less than " 5 " reveal that officials had varying levels of 
dissatisfaction with these public assistance initiatives. While a detailed description of each is 
beyond the scope of this paper, our research supports the following overview and 
generalizations. 
11 
- Table 2 goes about here -
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City governments have established modest programs to provide locally funded public 
assistance to agencies that serve poor and underprivileged citizens, to revitalize distressed 
neighborhoods, and to write regulations and create programs serving lower-income residents. 
Many of these programs have been institutionalized in ways that diminish controversy when 
they have returned to the council for continued funding, and elected officials vote in support of 
them with various degrees of enthusiasm. While interesting issues have arisen regarding 
initiatives, expansions, contractions, and reorientations of these programs, there have been few 
major changes during the past decade in the overall involvement of municipal governments in 
public assistance in our sample cities. 
The federal Revenue Sharing (RS) program begun in 1972 enabled many cities to 
partially fund agencies providing social services and related forms of public assistance. During 
the 1970s, many social service agencies emerged and grew, attaining funds from many sources: 
from private charities and philanthropic foundations, from state and federal grants, from 
services rendered - as well as from RS. In 1987, RS disappeared, and some cities decided to 
continue to fund social service agencies, partly by seeking other forms of state and federal 
funding and partly by drawing upon local funding sources. At that time Topeka decided to 
replace lost RS monies with local funding, and it continues to provide about $500,000 to such 
agencies in its 2012 budget. Within the past decade, several social service agencies in Lee's 
Summit and the United Community Services board in Overland Park pleaded for supplemental 
city funding. In both of these cases, these requests were approved and funding is now renewed 
with little debate. Nevertheless, some of our cities have reported controversies over the funding 
of certain agencies. For example, in St. Joseph a slim majority approved transferring half of the 
city's funding for Eastside Human Resources (which offered recreational opportunities for low-
income youths) to Midcity Excellence (which proposed an alternative program emphasizing 
education and the arts). 
Since 1974, Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) have been used for 
revitalizing lower-income neighborhoods, but city officials have often been unhappy with these 
programs - less with the philosophy that city governments should play a role in improving the 
housing of the poor than with the results of these programs. Among the cities in our sample, 
Kansas City, Missouri, seems to have had the worst record in this regard. For many years, its 
Council allocated the bulk of its CDBG funds to the Housing and Community Development 
Financial Corporation and assigned it the task of increasing affordable housing for low-income 
residents. When it produced only a small number of units in relatively affluent neighborhoods, 
extensive negative publicity lead the Council to dismantle the agency and create an alternative. 
In Topeka and St. Joseph the wide dispersion of CDBG funds for rehabs throughout the 
community resulted in almost no visible improvements anywhere, which led council members 
to support alternative approaches that targeted funding on particular distressed blocks, with the 
hope that such targeting would generate the visible improvements that would attract private 
investments and thus significant progress in at least some locations. 
Cities are also involved in "affordable housing" programs in various ways. In Stockton, 
the city used CDBG funds to support a first-time homebuyers program and to assist with 
neighborhood revitalization through property improvement grants. Similarly, in Lee's Summit 
the Council approved using some of its CDBG funds to provide $3000 grants to lower-income 
residents seeking their first mortgage. Lawrence used CDBG dollars and unspent bond funds to 
capitalize a Homeowners Out Of Tenants (HOOT) program, that enabled 200 tenants to 
purchase their homes; but within a few years, many had been resold, capital gains had been 
realized, and few remained "affordable." In response, the City Commission converted HOOT 
into a Land Trust. Under this program, the City has used funds from the Trust to purchase land 
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for affordable homes; eligible lower-income families can build on this land (lowering their 
mortgages by as much as $50,000), provided they sign a 99-year lease with the City limiting the 
capital gains they would realize if they resell their home, a provision intended to ensure that the 
homes remain affordable. 
Such programs had strong support among urban officials, but others proved highly 
controversial. In Raytown, the council rejected a multi-family low-income housing project 
abetting more affluent homes, but a year later, it approved for the same plot of land another 
project (Jessica Estates) that would serve low-income senior citizens. While Jessica Estates was 
unanimously approved, several Council members thought that rejection of the original project 
illustrated class and racial biases that they found all too familiar in the history of this 
community. 
Homeless shelters were prominent issues in our cities, but they were usually built and 
staffed through charitable contributions, with City Hall providing only modest support. In Lodi, 
the Salvation Army raised $1.2 million to expand and relocate its shelter, and the City used 
$300,000 of its CDBG funds to support this project. The Lodi Council also approved annual 
contributions of $50,000 from local funds to staff the shelter, despite some reservations that 
funding the Salvation Army (a religious organization) violated separation-of-church-and-state 
principles. In 2003, a progressive Lawrence City Commission appointed a Task Force on 
Homelessness, which proposed a new $2.7 million shelter to consolidate and enhance the 
programs of three agencies, with the city contributing $500,000 toward the building and another 
$500,000 annually for operating expenses. While the progressives who dominated the City 
Commission between 2003 and 2007 were enthusiastic supporters of this recommendation, and 
while subsequent Commissions have generally supported the project, it has remained in limbo 
pending the resolution of funding and locational issues. 
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Still, Lawrence and other cities have found ways to provide public assistance to its 
lower-income residents from local funds. In 2000 Lawrence increased property taxes to begin 
'The T," a mini-transit system that is widely viewed as a service for the poor, improving their 
access to jobs, medical centers, and various public facilities. When a new set of city 
commissioners expressed reluctance to continue funding the T from property taxes, Lawrence 
voters approved a half-cent sales tax for that purpose in November 2008. In 2003, Lawrence 
also passed an ordinance requiring businesses seeking a tax abatement to pay their employees a 
living wage. In 2003 Berkeley's City Council voted to increase living wage rates by more than 
10 percent and later separately approved a plan to provide supplemental funding of those 
nonprofits that would have difficulty providing such increases. In 2006, the Richmond City 
Council voted to require any entity doing business with the city to hire at least 30% of its 
workers locally; according to some council members, this ordinance was motivated by a desire 
to enhance job opportunities for lower-income youths living in the city. Perhaps most 
impressively, KCMO voters upheld a Council proposal for a 2.2 mill increase in property taxes 
to finance indigent health care by designated hospitals and ambulance services in Kansas City. 
While such initiatives are perhaps the exception to the overall pattern of limited city 
involvement in public assistance programs, they do illustrate that city officials are responsive to 
perceived needs of the disadvantaged and suggest that they often have "progressive" justice 
principles and act upon them. 
Ethics Matter in the Provision of Public Assistance 
As Table 3 shows, public officials are quite supportive of justice principles that might 
lead them to support public assistance. The first three rows indicate that there is more support 
than opposition for principles that claim that officials should provide floors (or minimal needed 
goods) for disadvantaged citizens, focus on the poor, and uphold welfare rights. The fourth and 
fifth rows show more opposition than support for other distributive principles. Those council 
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members opposing the principle of "equal distribution" (55%) and neutral regarding that 
principle (23%) usually explained their opposition or hesitation by stating that "unequal needs" 
must usually take priority over "equality." Not only is there more overall opposition than 
support for libertarian principles, but only 13% of our officials claimed to be strong libertarians 
who reject using governmental taxing powers to "redistribute" resources and provide public 
assistance. However, the final row shows that utilitarianism is one of most supported principles 
of justice and morality among urban officials, and as argued by John Rawls (1971), it can be 
understood as undercutting support for helping the poor.9 
- Tables 3 and 4 go about here -
Table 4 shows that urban officials report that the most important factor affecting their 
decisions on the 22 issues listed in Table 2 were their own principles of justice and morality. 
The average (mean) scores in this table indicate the overall importance of each of the listed 
factors in affecting their positions on the specific public assistance issues. Officials thought 
group pressures were irrelevant to their positions on over 60% of their public assistance 
decisions, and another 10% of the time, they claimed to take a position that was counter to 
dominant group pressures. Officials also reported being little influenced by constituency 
preferences. More than half of the time, officials said they thought citizens in their district and 
throughout the city had no meaningful preferences on public assistance issues. Although urban 
officials are constrained by federal requirements in their allocation of CDBG funds and by 
various state regulations, they normally skipped over such constraints in expressing the factors 
that influenced their positions. For most such officials, jurisdictional matters were simply 
"givens" that bounded broader policy options in public assistance but did not come to mind as 
influencing decisions on particular issues. 
City officials often cited economic considerations as very important, especially on the 
neighborhood revitalization issues. On most of these matters, they saw programs helping the 
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needy as having a positive economic impact on the city. On only a few occasions did officials 
say that they wanted to reduce support for social services or neighborhood revitalization 
because they thought such programs had a significant negative impact on the economic 
condition of the city or on the municipal budget. 
In general, officials saw ethical principles as being the most important factor influencing 
their positions on these issues, and they cited a wide variety of such principles as the basis for 
both supporting and opposing public assistance. Officials most often simply expressed a general 
ethical obligation of public officials to help the disadvantaged. However, it would be too simple 
to limit analysis of the moral principles of public officials to their embracing "an obligation to 
assist the poor." Officials referred to a much wider set of moral and justice principles when they 
explained why they considered such principles important to their policy decisions. Sometimes 
they spoke about the need to ensure their residents had access to the basic minimal goods 
required for survival. Sometimes they mentioned the need for the public to help those 
"handicapped folks without marketable skills." Sometimes they simply spoke of generating 
more equal conditions for everyone. Beyond such redistributive concerns, they also expressed 
related social justice ideals. For example, some Lee's Summit officials cited the desirability of 
enhancing class and racial diversity as the basis for their support of the first-time homeowners 
program. Providing fair equal opportunity - enabling inexperienced minority youths to have 
better job prospects - was cited as a key justification for Richmond's local employment 
ordinance. And equity - having those businesses that benefit from city subsidies assume the 
legal responsibility of enhancing the benefits they provide their employees - was cited as an 
important basis for adopting Lawrence's living wage ordinance. 
Officials who opposed public assistance also express principled reasons for their 
positions. Such officials often claimed that local government had no legitimate role to play in 
the area of public assistance. Libertarian norms were occasionally cited; some officials claimed 
that the role of government should be limited to satisfying common needs like public safety and 
should not extend to "playing Robin Hood." Various principles of "just deserts" were also 
expressed to limit public assistance. For example, one official said, "I believe in a hand up, not 
a hand out. We should help people get off the ground, but we shouldn't help those who refuse to 
help themselves, who refuse to put out effort." Those officials who opposed concentrating 
CDBG funds on specific neighborhoods in Topeka and St. Joseph expressed the principle of 
"equal treatment;" they stressed that non-targeted neighborhoods (their neighborhoods) were 
unfairly excluded. As mentioned above, the principle of moral neutrality was brought to bear on 
the Salvation Army issue in Lodi, as several council members were concerned that such funding 
might violate the norm of separation of church and state. Procedural justice was sometimes 
violated by favoritism in the allocation of some public assistance funding, according to a few 
officials. For example, one council women in Overland Park who was highly supportive of 
increasing local funding for social services was deeply concerned that people connected to 
specific social service agencies sat on the board making recommendations for how to allocate 
public funds among agencies. 
In sum, an examination of the resolution of concrete policy decisions regarding public 
assistance suggests that officials normally support on-going programs, seek ways of improving 
their public assistance allocations, and often support using local funds for what they regard as 
"good causes." Officials see themselves little constrained by economic imperatives, public 
pressures, or jurisdictional limitations in such decision-making. They instead see their support 
for public assistance as based on their principles of morality and justice. Because ethical 
concerns cannot be reduced to focusing on one or two precepts of justice, a pluralist conception 
of justice that embraces a wide range of principles is required. Many principles are brought to 
bear on public assistance issues, strengthening our belief that "ethics matter" in policymaking. 
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But our analysis of concrete issues leaves unclear which, if any, justice principles are 
particularly potent in prompting officials to adopt public assistance policies. 
How Urban Officials Respond to Hypothetical Public Assistance issues 
Examining the reactions of urban officials to various hypothetical issues can supplement 
our understanding of the role of justice principles. Table 5 lists four such issues that we 
presented to each of our 95 officials and their preferences on them. Examining these preferences 
assesses the proclivity to act rather than actual policymaking behavior, 1 0 but three gains can be 
had from such an analysis. First, public assistance is always an evolving frontier at the local 
level. Policy innovations like living-wage ordinances diffuse through cities (Martin 2006), but 
many public assistance issues have never arisen in certain cities, perhaps because they have 
been suppressed by the exercise of the "second face of power" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). 
Yet, by introducing hypothetical issues, we can assess the receptivity of officials to such 
innovations. Second, hypothetical issues enable analysts to determine linkages between 
principles and policy orientations, measured in separate contexts, rather than accept at face 
value the "socially acceptable" and "political correct" ethical justifications that officials might 
provide for their policymaking behavior. Third, hypothetical issues provide the equivalent 
policy preferences, lacking in the assorted concrete issues that we have discussed in the last 
section, that enable analysis of overall causal relationships linking officials ethical principles to 
policy goals. 
- Table 5 goes about here -
Overall, Table 5 shows that city officials are quite polarized over living wage ordinances 
and linkage policies; they are fairly evenly divided between opposing and supporting living 
wages and were somewhat more supportive than opposed to seeking linkage concessions from 
businesses seeking incentives for locating in the community. Officials tended to take more 
neutral positions regarding the homeless, though generosity toward them was more supported 
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than adopting unwelcoming restrictions on their behavior. Most officials were also neutral on 
the issue of targeting or exempting social service agencies from cuts during a budgetary crisis, 
though there was more support for exempting social services from such cuts than for targeting 
them for especially deep cuts. 
Factors affecting support for public assistance 
Our most general hypothesis is that the justice principles of public officials are 
significant factors affecting their receptivity to more generous public assistance policies. But 
this general hypothesis gives us little purchase on the specific principles that enhance (or reduce) 
support for public assistance. Allegiance to any of the six principles listed in Table 3 (and 
perhaps others not included there) might be the key determinant on all or any of our hypothetical 
issues, but there is, as yet, no sound theoretical basis for claiming that a particular principle will 
be particularly compelling on policy decisions generally or on specific public assistance issues in 
cities. 
In the absence of such theoretical guidance, analysts have often retreated to using 
ideological orientations as a summary measure of the justice principles to which officials are 
allegiant. This approach seems reasonable, as we have elsewhere shown that city officials who 
regard themselves as liberals are most allegiant to providing floors and focusing on the 
disadvantaged, while those who regard themselves as conservatives are most allegiant to 
libertarian and utilitarian principles (Schumaker and Kelly 2012). But these relationships are 
weak, and the interrelationships among the six justice principles listed in Table 3 are not 
particularly strong. 1 1 Findings that liberals tend to support and conservatives tend to oppose 
public assistance do not, therefore, enable us to know which justice principle(s) is the basis for 
the policy orientation. Linkages between ideological orientations and policy choices provide 
evidence that some justice principles are important, but they do not allow us to specify which 
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one(s). We thus include measures of various principles of justice (as well as a measure of 
ideological orientation) as possible determinants of support for public assistance policies. 
Pluralist value theory recognizes the role of many principles, and pluralists doubt that 
the special relevance of a particular principle of justice can be determined by philosophical 
reasoning. Instead, pluralists suggest that the principles that apply and should apply to particular 
decisions are best discovered through anthropological or sociological investigations; they seek to 
discover the "social understandings" about fairness that are widely held and pursued in particular 
communities (Walzer 1983, 3-6). 
In accord with such a pluralist approach, we hypothesize that allegiance to the floors 
principle is the strongest predictor of officials' support for public assistance in American cities. 
In response to criticisms that his earlier A Theory of Justice relied too much on abstract 
philosophical reasoning and over-stated the importance of his famous "difference principle" that 
required steadfast attention to improving the conditions of the disadvantaged, John Rawls 
(1993,164) subsequently argued that the overlapping consensus among people in pluralist 
societies includes the idea that governments are responsible for responding to the essential needs 
of the disadvantaged. He stressed there is widespread commitment to such a floors principle 
among people holding different moral and ideological doctrines. While part of what it means to 
be a liberal today is to support more extensive floors, it should not be forgotten that 
"compassionate conservatives" also acknowledge the need for "safety nets" and participate in 
local social service policy networks. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) and Scott, Matland, 
Michelbach, and Bornstein (2001) are among many scholars who have shown widespread 
support for the floors principle in American society. In short, the floors principle provides a 
general minimal conception of social justice that most city officials are likely to find persuasive 
when they confront public assistance issues. 
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In contrast, we hypothesize that other social justice principles are likely to have 
drawbacks that reduce their impact. Academics may have long debated the competing ideas that 
policymakers should follow Rawls' difference principle that seems to forbid creating policies 
that further burden the disadvantaged or the libertarian idea associated with Robert Nozick 
(1974) that policymakers should avoid redistribution, but if political philosophers have been 
unable to resolve the Rawls-Nozick debate and agree on the universal applicability of these 
contrasting justice principles, it is doubtful that urban officials find either completely compelling. 
When confronted with linkage, living wage, or homelessness policy issues, officials may regard 
the impact on the poor as important, but they are likely to have other concerns that make them 
skeptical that the poor should have some sort of veto power over their decisions. Similarly, they 
seem likely to regard the libertarian prohibition of redistribution as an unjustified veto power by 
the well-off over their decisions. 
While many urban officials find the principle of welfare rights morally compelling (as 
shown in Table 3), they usually indicated in our interviews that welfare rights are and should be 
provided by federal and state law, and they expressed little inclination to have municipal 
governments provide additional welfare rights. While normally allegiant to the utilitarian 
principle, officials are unlikely to turn to it for guidance on public assistance decisions because it 
makes distributional (justice) considerations subordinate to moral considerations (about the 
overall public interest); at least on issues regarding public assistance, they are likely to believe 
that the needs of the poor must take priority over "the greater good." Finally, the idea of 
pursuing equal distributions is simply indeterminate because of the many meanings that can be 
attached to the concept of "equality" (Rae 1981). 
While our primary concern is with how support for local public assistance is affected by 
such justice principles of city officials, other factors must be considered, as the principles that 
officials hold, proclaim, and apply could be a function of the sort of personal and community 
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characteristics that are usually studied by urban and political analysts. When using multiple 
regression to examine how officials' justice principles impact their support for our four 
hypothetical issues, we thus controlled for the following factors: the socioeconomic status and 
race of officials,1 2 the affluence and racial composition of the officials' constituency, the extent 
to which "compassion for the poor" is an important element of the political culture in the city, 
the extent to which the regime that dominates local politics is characterized as economically 
conservative, and the extent to which the city's bargaining position in competition with other 
cities to attract mobile wealth is strong. Officials provided estimates on 5-point scales of each of 
these contextual variables. 1 3 
We report our findings from our 12 cities about the factors associated with support for 
generous policies toward the homeless (Table 6), for living wage policies (Table 7), for linkage 
policies (Table 8) and for exempting public assistance form budget cuts (Table 9). The 
independent variables include officials' ideological orientations, their support for the six justice 
principles listed in Table 3, and various personal and contextual characteristics. The first 
columns of these tables show that there are many significant correlations between these factors 
and support for public assistance; ideological orientations and support for various justice 
principles are often significantly linked to policy preferences, at levels at least as strong as the 
links between personal and contextual factors and policy preferences. However, to address the 
limitations of correlation analysis, we also report the results of two different kinds of regression 
models used to estimate the independent impacts of these factors.1 4 In contrast to the thinner 
models (2), the fuller models (1) include a measure of (increasingly liberal) ideological 
orientations and a measure of the interaction effects between support for the floors principle and 
the economic position of the city. Including this interaction effect in the fuller models is 
intended to address the problem of possible sample selection bias. Perhaps our cities are 
relatively free from the inter-city competition for attracting mobile wealth that Peterson (1981) 
23 
claims is a major constraint for providing generous public assistance policies. Perhaps support 
for the floors principle could appear to be an important determinant of support for public 
assistance policies, but only because officials in our sample are in cities having economic 
positions that are strong compared to other communities, and this comparative economic 
advantage produces both support for the floors principle and support for public assistance 
policies. But our interaction term allows a test for this possibility because there is significant 
variation within our sample cities on their economic position, and bur fuller models (1) show that 
the combination of supporting the floors principle and being in a city that is well-positioned 
economically has no independent effect on our results. 1 5 As a consequence, we can eliminate 
this interaction term in more parsimonious models (2). We also eliminate our measure of 
ideological orientation in models 2, but for very different reasons. While ideological orientations 
are inadequate indicators of officials support for various justice principles, they are associated 
with such principles. Thus, the inclusion of ideological orientations in models 1 means that 
some of the impact of a principle (such as support for floors) will be accounted for by the 
measure of ideological orientation. While it is illuminating to see how well measures of 
ideology, in comparisons to measures of various justice principles, predict support for public 
assistance policies (as is done in models 1), it is also illuminating to see how various principles 
of justice influence such support when the impacts of these principles are not diluted by the 
simultaneous influence of ideology (as in models 2). 
- Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 go about here -
In general, the adjusted coefficients of determination of our models indicate that these 
variables explain between 17 and 41 percent of the variance in officials' stances on public 
assistance. Except for the issue of exempting public assistance from budget cuts, the ideological 
orientations of officials are significantly correlated with positions on public assistance, but these 
associations become less significant when controls are applied for the specific principles of 
officials and other factors. Except for the ideal of equal distribution, the other justice principles 
were significantly correlated with positions on at least one public assistance issue, but no justice 
principle had a significant independent impact on stances of any of our four hypothetical issues. 
Except for officials' perceptions of the economic position of their cities in competition with other 
cities for mobile wealth, our other control variables were each significantly correlated with 
stances on some public assistance issue, but none had strong impacts across all issues. The 
multiple regression coefficients (B) and associated standard errors (s.e.) indicate that only one or 
two factors had significant independent effects on support for our four hypothetical issues. The 
factor that most often and most strongly impacted such support was officials' allegiance to the 
floors principle. 
Being nonwhite and having a liberal ideological orientation are the two factors that most 
directly and significantly prompt officials to be generous to the homeless. Nonwhite officials are 
probably particularly sensitive to minorities being disproportionate homeless and are sensitive to 
their needs. On this issue, a broad liberal orientation is sufficient to capture the notion that 
various social justice principles are relevant to supporting of opposing policies toward the 
homeless, but the results in Table 6 indicate that no particular justice principle is the key factor. 
On this issue, different liberal officials draw on various liberal ethical inclinations (including 
those justice principles correlated with generosity toward the homeless in Table 6), but no 
particular justice principle adds significant explanatory power to positions on homelessness after 
ideological orientations are taken into account. 
Receptivity to the living wage ordinance is significantly enhanced by both a liberal 
ideological orientation and by support for the floors principle. Living wage ordinances are 
crafted to ensure more employees have incomes sufficient to provide for the basic needs of 
themselves and their families, and so it is not surprising that the floors principles has the strong 
independent impact on support for living wages that is revealed in model 2. While allegiance to 
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the floors principle is part of what it means to be liberal, the floors principle is important beyond 
its role in liberalism. Some moderates and conservatives see the floors principle as ethically 
compelling, and so allegiance to it can generate support for living wages that is missed when 
analysts take into account only broad ideological orientations. 
Allegiance to the floors principle has a strong positive impact on support for linkage 
policies. The ideological orientations of officials are correlated with their seeing merit in 
requiring those businesses granted public incentives to locate in a city to provide linkage 
benefits for the more disadvantaged segments of the community, but both of our regression 
models enable us to locate attachment to the floors principles as being the principle component 
of a liberal orientation that is important. Officials who operate within conservative political 
regimes are, not surprisingly, relatively adverse to linkage policies, but controlling for regime 
type does not diminish the role that allegiance to the floors principle has on supporting linkage 
policies. 
Finally, model 2 in Table 9 shows that the factors that directly increase support for 
exempting public assistance from budget cuts are officials being nonwhite, representing 
minority constituencies, and supporting the floors principle. Because minorities are 
disproportionately dependent on public assistance, the racial interests of officials who are 
minorities and who represent minorities are important beyond the ethical principles that officials 
hold. But even when such racial interests are taken into account, support for the floors principle 
seems to have an independent impact on officials being willing to exempt public assistance 
from budget cuts when hard financial decisions must be made during economic crises. 
Summary and Discussion 
City governments have a limited role in providing public welfare, but they do oversee 
and support some modest public assistance programs. When public assistance issues arise, 
mayors and council members see themselves as little constrained by group pressures and public 
opinion, and they claim to be only modestly constrained by economic considerations. They 
regard their decisions as more strongly based on ethical considerations. While such officials 
hold a wide variety of principles of justice and morality, most include concerns for the least 
advantaged among such principles. Justice principles are often invoked when they take 
positions and vote on public assistance issues. Ethics seem to matter on such issues. 
No factor seems more important when it comes to being receptive to public assistance 
initiatives than embracing the idea that "public officials should adopt policies that ensure all 
citizens a minimal level of the goods they need." Such a floors principle - along with other 
social justice principles - is embedded in a liberal ideological orientation, and it is associated 
with being a racial minority and living in a political culture that is sympathetic to the poor, but 
considering just these other factors when trying to understand receptivity to public assistance is 
insufficient. Not all officials support the floors principle, but enough do that - regardless of 
their race or ideology - allegiance to it can be important. 
These findings have implications for policy analysts who study urban policy, for 
political theory generally and urban theory in particular, and for advocates of redressing urban 
poverty. Students of urban policy should be clear that American cities do not provide a context 
where much redistribution of wealth is likely to occur or where citizens have welfare rights 
provided by city governments. Nevertheless, such governments are engaged in a variety of 
public assistance programs that can provide some basic services and address some basic needs 
of the impoverished, even if the poor do not have legal rights to such services and resources. 
When studying what city governments do for the poor, urban policy analysis should frame their 
research as urban public assistance policy - not urban redistribution, not urban anti-poverty 
programs, or other such terminology. 
Our findings are consistent with the leading theoretical approaches for studying urban 
politics: Ostrom's collective-action approach, regime theory, and reconstructed pluralism. 
Urban officials are significant, if often secondary, actors in public assistance policy networks. 
What they can bring to these networks are not just the (limited) financial resources of local 
governments, but their commitments to social justice. To some extent, regime theorists can use 
ideological orientations to analyze the role of moral and justice principles of elected officials in 
urban policy, but these are very blunt instruments. Conservative officials, for example, 
generally support both utilitarian and libertarian principles. A regime analysis that includes a 
study of officials' ideological orientations may conclude that efforts to adopt living wage 
ordinances have failed due to resistance by the conservatives, but such analysis cannot enable us 
to specify whether it was their allegiance to utilitarianism or libertarianism that was the more 
decisive moral concern. If regime theorists take seriously Clarence Stone's claim that urban 
officials bring their moral codes and purposes to urban decision-making, they should seek to 
specify as precisely as possible the moral principles in play. 
Our findings are also consistent with a reconstructed pluralist theoretical understanding 
of politics generally. Political outcomes are not just a function of power politics, of applying 
power resources to achieve one's interests. The ethical understandings that people bring to 
politics matter. But people have allegiances to many moral and justice principles, and certain 
principles come to the forefront on particular issues. In this paper we bring attention to the 
diversity of justice principles of officials. We show that both broad ideological orientations and 
more specific justice principles play a role in the receptivity of elected officials to providing 
public assistance to the disadvantaged. Our findings suggest that urban officials are particularly 
likely to apply the floors principle when confronting public assistance issues at the local level. 
We do not claim that the floors principle is the dominant justice principle that officials apply in 
a variety of contexts and to most distributive decisions. Urban officials may be most guided by 
utilitarian principles on economic development issues, and federal officials may be most guided 
by allegiance to welfare rights when addressing welfare issues. A reconstructed or principled 
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pluralism will seek to understand when, where, and why various justice principles matter in 
politics. 
For advocates on behalf of the urban poor, our findings suggest that urban officials may 
be most receptive to arguments that are framed in the language of the floors principle. Officials 
have some allegiance to the idea that they should focus on the poor, as suggested by the justice 
principles of John Rawls, but making a Rawlsian argument is unlikely to be effective because 
few officials think they should always focus on the poor. Perhaps officials doubt that every 
policy decision has to improve the conditions of the disadvantaged, but public assistance 
measures that can improve their conditions are hard to reject. Officials have some allegiance to 
the idea that citizens have welfare rights, but claims that the homeless have a right to shelter is 
unlikely to be effective because few city officials think that they or their constituents have a 
duty to provide that right. Perhaps the poor have no right to shelter, but few officials are so 
hard-hearted as to be unreceptive to meeting basic needs. The floors principle resonates with 
some officials who generally hold more conservative principles and who have little sympathy 
for welfare rights or focusing on the disadvantaged. Finding a language that brings the floors 
principle to the forefront of such officials might well increase the amount of public assistance 
available to the urban poor. 
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1 The quantitative data compiled from the interviews reported in this paper will be available at 
the principal author's website within six months of publication. 
2 Local welfare spending increased from $47.5 Billion to $51.9 Billion in these two years while 
state welfare spending increased from $335.5 Billion to $379.2 Billion. These figures are 
available at www.census.gov/govs/estimate. While the 2007 data provide breakdowns for 
various governments including municipalities and counties, the 2009 data provide only 
estimates for all local governments collectively. According to the 2007 data. American counties 
provided 75% of all local welfare spending, municipalities 23%, and special districts only 2%. 
3 Current federal law requires cities to allocate 70% of their CDBG funds for activities that 
benefit low- and moderate-income persons. 
4 Piven (2001) emphasized the role of ideological norms in explaining cutbacks of public 
welfare. 
5 While Eulau and Prewitt (1974) described the "policy maps" of city officials, they 
conceptualized these maps without attention to the sorts of moral and justice principles that 
have concerned contemporary political philosophers. Subsequent work referring to the moral 
and justice norms of policymakers has been limited in scope. For example, studies of 
"progressive" cities (e.g., DeLeon 1992) and politicians (e.g., Rast 1999) provide thick 
descriptions of certain norms and the capacity of actors to translate these norms into urban 
policy, but these studies do not provide the sorts of conceptual frameworks or systematic 
empirical analyses that enable a broad theoretical understanding of the role of ethics in urban 
politics. As an antidote to these limitations, we have conceptualized and examined such ethical 
maps that include both moral principles (conceptions of the public good) and justice principles 
(principles about the fair distribution of social goods). Our focus in this paper is on only some 
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justice principles, but an overview of the ethical maps of urban officials can be found in 
Schumaker and Kelly (2012). 
6 Because the Census does not report current data on individuals living below the poverty in two 
of our cities (Raytown and Lodi), we list the median household income for 2007. 
7 Most officials included in our data set were from a particular council within our sample cities. 
However, a few persons who had served on a previous council were also interviewed when they 
were identified as playing key roles in the concrete issues under investigation. Most interviews 
within particular cities were conducted within a 3-6 month period when officials were not 
subject to electoral pressures. Among the factors contributing to extended time-period for 
completing the data collection was the need to await the resolution of certain issues that had 
arisen but remained unresolved, even after interviews were completed. In such circumstances, 
call-back telephone interviews were sometimes used as required. 
8 We found no discrepancies between self-reported voting and what the record revealed. Of course, 
officials sometimes voted in ways that did not reflect their own preferences. 
9 We defer further discussion of these principles and the philosophical support for them until 
they are analyzed as possible determinants of officials' receptivity to public assistance issues in 
the final section of this paper. 
1 0 The proclivity to act, however, is associated with actual behavior, at least for a couple of 
issues discussed below. Regarding our hypothetical living wage issue, only two of our cities 
(Berkeley and Lawrence) have passed living wage ordinances, and support for our hypothetical 
was significantly higher in these two cities (3.83) than in our ten cities without such an 
ordinance (2.82). Regarding our hypothetical issue of exempting public assistance from budget 
cuts, council members in two communities (Topeka, and KCK) were most supportive of such 
exemptions and those in two other communities (Richmond and Lodi) were most willing to 
disproportionately cut public assistance. Recent budgets from these cities generally uphold this 
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pattern, as Topeka has increased its contributions to (identifiable) social service agencies since 
the recession began in 2008 by 4% and KCK (which is, interestingly, a consolidated municipal 
and county governmental entity) has increased its contribution to such agencies by about 20%. 
In contrast, Richmond discontinued its only public assistance program (supporting 
disadvantaged youth) while Lodi has not expended any local funds on public assistance during 
the past decade. 
1 1 The strongest correlation (r = .55) is between providing floors and upholding rights. Less than a 
quarter of the inter-correlations among these six principles are statistically significant. 
1 2 Lacking measures of income, we used educational attainment and occupational history to 
attain a five-point scale of increasing socioeconomic status. Fifteen of our officials were 
African-American, Asian-Americans, or Latinos, and so a dummy variable of race is employed 
with 0 assigned to whites and 1 assigned to all nonwhites. While 29 of our officials were 
women, we found few interesting differences between the men and women in our sample and 
thus ignore gender in our models below. 
1 3 Perceived, rather than "objective," measures of city and district characteristics are analyzed 
for two reasons. First, many of these characteristics resist clear objective measurement (see, for 
example, Peter Fisher (2005) for a discussion of the difficulties in measuring the economic 
position of cities). Second, what matters for our purposes is how officials internalize and assess 
these factors. For example, if the economic position of a city matters in public assistance 
decision-making, then surely what is important is how officials' perceive their city's economic 
position. 
1 4 Because our dependent variables were measured using 5-point ordinal scales, we tested our 
models using ordered logit as well as ordinary least squares (OLS). Since there were no 
important differences, we report only the more easily interpretable OLS coefficients here. 
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Reporting the insignificant regression coefficients examining these potential interaction 
effects is the most parsimonious way of addressing this issue. However, we have also re-
examined our models while omitting the 28 cases where officials perceived that their cities were 
advantaged in their competition for mobile wealth with other communities. The results were 
basically the same for this smaller subsample of 57 officials living in communities lacking the 
sort of economic advantages that might have prompted them to hold more strongly to the floors 
principle and to support public assistance policies. For both the living wage and the linkage 
policy issues, the regression coefficients remained statistically significant at the .05 level. For 
the issue of exempting social service from budget cuts, the regression coefficient for the smaller 
sample was almost identical to that in the larger sample; however, the larger standard error in 
the smaller sample produced a result that was only statistically significant at the .10 level. 
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Table 1 
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Kansas City 146 - 1 % 48 44 CM 10 + 1 
Overland Park 173 +15% 16 91 MC 12+1 
Topeka 127 + 3% 24 52 MC 8 + 1 
Lawrence 88 +9% 18 62 CM 5 
California 
Berkeley 113 +10% 41 87 CM 8 + 1 
Richmond 104 +5% 69 66 CM 8+1 
Stockton 295 +19% 63 64 CM 6 + 1 
Lodi 62 +9% 26 51 CM 5 
'CM = Council-Manager (reformed); MC = Mayor-Council (unreformed) 
Table 2 
Councilmember positions on public assistance issues in 12 Cities 
% voting in support 
of assistance 
Mean expressed support 
for assistance* 
Raytown, MO 
Exempt REAP (the Raytown emergency 
assistance program) from budget cuts 40 
Support Jessica Estates low-income housing for 
the elderly 100 
Kansas City, MO 
Property tax increase to provide $13 million to 
hospitals and ambulance services for 100 
indigent medical care 
Transfer $18 million in annual CDBG funds to new 
housing authority for low-income housing, 
emergency shelters, and mortgage 
assistance for first-time homeowners 100 
Lees Summit, MO 
Provide local funding to build Hope House and 
emergency home-heating assistance 100 
Allocate CDBG funds for mortgage assistance for first-
time homeowners and for helping 
disabled improve accessibility within homes 100 
St Joseph, MO 
Reallocate CDBG funding among agencies 
serving low-income youth 100 
Target C D B G funds for rehabbing homes to 
designated low-income neighborhoods 63 
Kansas City, KS 
Fund locally Willa Gill Food Kitchen and 
provide start-up funds for agencies 89 
Permit and partially fund low-income 
scattered-site housing projects 100 
Overland Park, KS 
Supplement CDBG and private funding of 
United Community Services by $750,000 100 
Enhance enforcement of building codes for rental 
units in less affluent neighborhoods and subsidize 
efforts of low-income home 














Table 2 (continued) 
Lawrence, KS 
Initiate and fund "The T" bus system 100 
Commence homeless shelter initiatives 80 
Create Land Trust program applying unused 
bond funds for building affordable housing 100 
Require businesses receiving tax abatements 
to pay employees a living-wage 60 
Topeka, KS 
Fund social services from local sources 62 
Target CDBG funds for rehabbing homes to 
designated low-income neighborhoods 89 
Berkeley, CA 
Increase living wage rate and increase funding 
of nonprofits affected by the increase 100 
Stockton, CA 
Pass action-plan to use CDBG funds for various 
agencies and property improvements 
in targeted areas 100 
Lodi, CA 
Fund Salvation Army homeless shelter 75 
Richmond, CA 
Pass local employment ordinance 100 
Average of council members support for public assistance on a 5-point scale, where 
1 = opposition in principle to local governmental role on the issue 
2 = criticize effectiveness of existing programs or proposed enhancements 
3 = neutral, maintain existing level and form of funding and present programs 
4 = qualified support for either greater or more effective assistance by city 
5 = strongly supportive of enhanced city role on the public assistance issue 
Table 3 
Councilmember support for various distributive principles* 
% supportive % opposed Mean support 
Provide floors: Public officials should adopt polices that 
ensure all citizens a minimal level of the goods they need. 57 17 3.62 
Focus on the least advantaged (Rawls* egalitarian 
liberalism): Public officials should adopt policies that 
improve the conditions of the least advantaged citizens -
those who were raised in unfavorable social circumstances or 
who were less endowed at birth. They should reject policies 
that make relatively disadvantaged citizens worse off ~ even 
if such policies are otherwise beneficial. They should 
normally try to make the disadvantaged better off, even if this 
imposes some costs on the more advantaged. 55 18 3.56 
Uphold welfare rights: Public officials should uphold the 
right of all citizens to basic food, shelter and health care. 63 17 3.69 
Distribute equally: Public officials should distribute goods 
and services equally to all citizens, even ignoring such things 
as the different qualifications and needs of people. 22 55 2.52 
Avoid redistribution (Libertarianism): Public officials 
should avoid redistributing those allocations of goods that 
have been made by the free choices of individuals in the 
Seek overall public welfare (Utilitarianism): Public 
officials should adopt those policies and programs that serve 
the overall public interest — that provide the greatest good for 
most citizens — and not be overly concerned about who is 
most benefited and who is most hurt by policies that best 
serve the public good. 55 15 3.61 
* After presenting and discussing these principles with each official, scores of "1" (strong opposition) to "5" 
(strong support) were assigned. While we took seriously officials' own scaling of support for these principles, we 
sometimes negotiated altered scores when official's comments about the meaning and applicability of these 
principles belied their initial self-assessments. In column 1, strong and weak support for a principle are combined. 
In column 2, strong and weak opposition to a principle are combined. Column 3 reports mean support scores based 
on the 5-point ordinal scale. 
free market. 36 48 2.77 
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Table 4 
Extent to which various factors were perceived as important bases of 
officials' positions on public assistance issues* 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Group pressures .71 1.41 
Preferences of constituents within district .99 1.35 
Preferences of citizens within city .96 1.28 
Persuasive arguments of other officials .72 1.27 
Legal considerations .58 1.13 
Jurisdictional considerations .64 1.17 
The local political culture .45 .98 
Economic considerations 2.24 1.70 
Principles of justice and morality 2.65 1.60 
* Officials were asked to indicate the importance of each consideration using the following scale: 
-1 = Factor weighed against their position 
0 = Factor was irrelevant 
1 = Factor was a minor (positive) consideration 
2 = Factor was a moderate consideration 
3 = Factor was an important consideration 
4 = Factor was a very important consideration 
5 = Factor was the preeminent consideration 
While most of our 95 officials provided such assessments on two issues arising in their city involving social service 
funding, low-income housing, and/or investments in low-income neighborhoods, some officials participated in 
fewer (or more) such issues. The total number of assessments (the N for this table) is 161. 
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Table 5 
Hypothetical public assistance issues 
(Percent of council members (N=95) opposing or supporting each issue) 
Strongly Weakly Neutral Weakly Strongly 
Opposed Opposed Support Support 
Generosity toward homeless 
"Suppose there has been a marked increase in the 
number of homeless people in your community, leading 
to two proposals. The first toughens up on the homeless 
by restrict panhandling and otherwise making the 
community less hospitable to them. The second 
provides more generous subsidies to social service 
agencies that provide shelters for the homeless. Would 
you support the'more welcoming'approach?" 4 13 33 23 27 
Living wages 
"Suppose you must consider a living-wage ordinance 
that requires any business receiving a significant 
municipal contract or a financial incentive or subsidy 
from the city to to pay its employees a wage that 
would raise a family above the official poverty level as 
well as provide health benefits. Would you oppose or 
support such a proposal?" 
Linkage policies 
"Suppose a giant in the computer industry is interested 
in locating in your community and investing hundreds 
of millions of dollars in an office park. Would you 
support providing this company the incentives (such as 
tax breaks) it wants to locate in your city but only if it 
agreed to 'linkage' provisions to help those who are 
not direct beneficiaries of the office park - for 
example through annual contributions to a community 
development fund to make improvements in the 
impoverished part of the city?" 
Exempting social services from budget cuts 
"Suppose that an economic recession and reduced 
federal and state aid has resulted in a large projected 
budget deficit for the upcoming year. All painless 
solutions have been exhausted, and your options come 
down to increasing taxes or reducing services. Would 
you (make social service funding a primary target for 
such cuts or) support exempting public assistance for 
the disadvantaged from such cuts?" 
32 15 6 19 28 
21 16 6 37 20 
4 7 68 6 14 
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Table 6 
Possible factors enhancing support for policies generous to the homeless' 
Model 1 Model 2 
r B s.e. B s.e. 
Liberal ideological orientation .45** 33** .10 — 
Provide floors .30* .04 .29 .12 .14 
Focus on the least advantaged .22* -.04 .13 -.01 .14 
Uphold welfare rights .23* .03 .12 .04 .13 
Distribute equally -.10 .01 .10 .01 .10 
Avoid redistribution -.38** -.10 .10 -.16 .10 
Seek aggregate public interest -.26* -.06 .11 -.13 .12 
Political culture is compassionate .17 .12 .12 .09 .13 
Political regime is conservative -.24* -.12 .11 -.20 .12 
Economic position of city is strong -.10 -.03 .33 -.04 .09 
Constituency is lower income .12 -.02 .15 -.01 .16 
Constituency is highly minority .23* -.09 .14 -.06 .15 
Socioeconomic status of official -.06 -.16 .15 -.14 .16 
Official is nonwhite .39** .85* .42 .84 .44 
Interaction of floors and 
economic position .10 -.01 .09 — -
Adjusted coefficient of determination .26 .17 
• Key to Tables 6 through 9: 
R indicates Pearson correlation coefficients 
B indicates regression coefficients 
s.e. indicates standard error for regression coefficient 
* indicates statistical significance at .05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at .01 level 
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Table 7 
Possible factors enhancing support for a living wage ordinance 
Model 1 Model 2 
r B s.e. B s.e. 
Liberal ideological orientation .55** .43** .14 
Provide floors .41** .26 .39 .53** .19 
Focus on the least advantaged .36** .17 .18 .18 .18 
Uphold welfare rights .17 -.21 .17 -.20 .18 
Distribute equally -.06 .01 .13 .01 .14 
Avoid redistribution -.35** -.15 .13 -.22 .13 
Seek aggregate public interest -.19* -.09 .15 -.16 .16 
Political culture is compassionate .24* .20 .17 .17 .17 
Political regime is conservative -.22* -.07 .15 -.18 .16 
Economic position of city is strong -.15 -.35 .45 -.16 .13 
Constituency is lower income .11 -.16 .20 -.15 .22 
Constituency is highly minority 31** .24 .19 .28 .20 
Socioeconomic status of official -.06 .07 .21 .07 .22 
Official is nonwhite .26* -.42 .57 -.40 .60 
Interaction of floors and 
economic position .11 .06 .12 -- — 
Adjusted coefficient of determination .33 .25 
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Table 8 
Possible factors enhancing support for linkage policies 
Model 1 Model 2 
r B s.e. B s.e. 
Liberal ideological orientation .25* -.04 .11 — — 
Provide floors .56** .55 .35 .65** .15 
Focus on the least advantaged .32** -.01 .15 -.03 .15 
Uphold welfare rights .36** -.04 .14 -.04 .14 
Distribute equally .04 .03 .11 .03 .11 
Avoid redistribution -.27** .01 .11 .01 .11 
Seek aggregate public interest -.18 -.08 .12 -.06 .12 
Political culture is compassionate .19 .05 .14 .06 .13 
Political regime is conservative -.19 -.31* .13 -.30* .12 
Economic position of city is strong -.21* -.29 .38 -.16 .10 
Constituency is lower income -.20* -.10 .17 -.10 .17 
Constituency is highly minority .35** .16 .16 .16 .16 
Socioeconomic status of official -.05 -.12 .17 -.13 .17 
Official is nonwhite 44** .74 .49 .76 .48 
Interaction of floors and 
economic position .16 .04 .10 - — 
Adjusted coefficient of determination .39 .41 
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Table 9 
Model 1 Model 2 
r B s.e. B s.e. 
Liberal ideological orientation .08 -.08 .08 — 
Provide floors .35** .11 .24 .25* .11 
Focus on the least advantaged .18 .07 .10 .04 .10 
Uphold welfare rights .16 .06 .10 .05 .10 
Distribute equally -.04 -.06 .08 -.07 .08 
Avoid redistribution -.23* -.01 .08 .01 .08 
Seek aggregate public interest -.12 .01 .09 .04 .09 
Political culture is compassionate .14 .15 .10 .17 .10 
Political regime is conservative -.04 .02 .09 .02 .09 
Economic position of city is strong -.05 -.23 .27 -.03 .07 
Constituency is lower income .17 .22 .12 .21 .12 
Constituency is highly minority .07 -.30* .12 -.31** .12 
Socioeconomic status of official .02 .04 .12 .03 .12 
Official is nonwhite .30** .34 1.01** .34 
Interaction of floors and 
economic position .18 .05 .07 — — 
Adjusted coefficient of determination .21 .21 
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Possible factors enhancing support for exempting public assistance from budget cuts 
References 
Bachrach, Peter and Morton Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of Power." American Political Science 
Review 56 (3): 947-952. 
Browning, Rufus P, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. 1983. Protest is Not Enough. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Craw, Michael. 2006. "Overcoming City Limits: Vertical and Horizontal Models of Local 
Redistributive Policy Making." Social Science Quarterly 87 (2): 361-379. 
DeLeon, Richard. 1992. Left Coast City. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Dreier, Peter, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom. 2004. Place Matters, 2 n d edition. 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Eisenberg, Abigail. 1995. Reconstructing Political Pluralism. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
Elkin, Stephen L. 1987. City and Regime in the American Republic. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Eulau, Heinz and Kenneth Prewitt. 1974. Labyrinths of Democracy. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-
Merrill. 
Fainstein, Susan. 2010. The Just City. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Feoick, Richard C. and John T. Scholz. 2010. Self-Organizing Federalism: Collaborative 
Mechanisms to Mitigate Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Fisher, Peter. 2005. Grading Places: What do Business Climate rankings Really Tell Us? 
Washington DC: Economic Policy Institute. 
Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 1992. Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach 
to Ethical Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
44 
Gais, Thomas. 2009. "Stretched Net: The Retrenchment of State and Local Social Welfare 
Spending Before the Recession." Publius 39 (3): 557-579. 
Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2010. Winner-Take-All Politics. New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 
Hackworth, Jason. 2007. The Neoliberal City. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press. 
Harvey, David. 2009. Social Justice and the City, revised edition. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press. 
Kantor, Paul, 1995. The Dependent City Revisited. Boulder CO: Westview. 
Kilburn, H. Whitt. 2004. "Explaining U.S. Urban Regimes: A Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis." Urban Affairs Review 39 (5): 633-651. 
Kingdon, John. 1989. Congressmen's Voting Decisions. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan 
Press. 
Lipsky, Michael, and Steven R. Smith. 1990. "Nonprofit Organizations, Government, and the 
Welfare State." Political Science Quarterly 104 (4): 625-648. 
Logan, John R., and Harvey L. Molotch, 1987. Urban Fortunes. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Mansbridge, Jane. 2010. "Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons: A Discussion of Governing the 
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collect Action," in Perspectives on Politics 
8(2): 569-593. 
Martin, Issac. 2006. "Do Living Wage Policies Diffuse." Urban Affairs Review 41 (5): 710-719. 
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. 
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Pack, Janet. 1998. "Poverty and Urban Public Expenditures." Urban Studies 35 (11): 1995-
2019. 
Peterson, Paul. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
45 
Piven, Frances Fox. 2001. "Globalization, American Politics, and Welfare Policy." The Annals of 
the American Academy 577 (3): 26-37. 
Rae, Douglas. 1981. Inequalities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Rast, Joel. 1999. Remaking Chicago. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press. 
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Rich, Michael, Michael W. Giles, and Emily Stern. 2001. "Collaborating to Reduce Poverty: 
Views from City Halls and Community-Based Organizations." Urban Affairs Quarterly 
37(2): 184-204. 
Sapotichne, Joshua, Bryan D. Jones, and Michelle Wolfe. 2007. "Is Urban Politics a Black 
Hole? Analyzing the Boundary Between Political Science and Urban Politics." Urban 
Affairs Review 43 (1): 76-106. 
Savitch, H.V. and Paul Kantor. 2002. Cities in the International Marketplace. Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Schumaker, Paul. 2010. "A Reconstructed Pluralist Public Philosophy: Elaborations and 
Implications," Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association," April 22,2010. 
Schumaker, Paul, and Marisa J. Kelly. 2012. "Ethics Matter: The Morality and Justice 
Principles of Elected City Officials and their Impact of Urban Issues," Journal of Urban 
Affairs. Forthcoming 
Scott, John T., Richard E. Matland, Philip A. Michelbach, and Brian Bornstein. 2011. "Just 
Deserts: An experimental Study of Distributive Justice Norms." American Journal of 
Political Science 45 (4): 749-767. 
Scott, John T., and Brian H. Bornstein. 2009. "What's Fair in Foul Weather and Fair? 
Distributive Justice across Different Allocation Contexts and Goods." Journal of Politics 
71 (3): 831-846. 
46 
Sharp. Elaine, and Steven Maynard-Moody. 1991. "Theories of the Local Welfare Role." 
American Journal of Political Science 35 (4): 934-950. 
Stein, Robert M. 1990. Urban Alternatives: Public and Private Markets in the Provision of 
Urban Services: Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Stone, Clarence. 1980. "Systematic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of 
Stratification Theory." American Political Science Review 74 (4): 978-990. 
Stone, Clarence. 1989. Regime Politics. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Stone, Clarence. 1993. "Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern." Journal of Urban Affairs 
15(1): 1-28. 
Stone, Clarence. 2005. "Looking Back to Look Forward: Reflections on Urban Regime 
Analysis." Urban Affairs Review 40 (3): 309-340. 
Swartz, Heidi, and Ion Bogdan Vasi. 2011. "Which Cities Adopt Living-Wage Ordinances? 
Predictors of Adoption of a New Labor Tactic, 1994-2006." Urban Affairs Review 47 
(6): 743-774. 
Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books. 
47 
